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Given the complexity of many social, environmental, and economic problems facing 
communities, nonprofit organizations are increasingly collaborating with public 
authorities—but the power dynamics of such arrangements can be extremely complex 
and fraught with institutional interests, as representatives of the various collaborating 
parties shift over time with changing political and other realities. The literature on such 
collaborations often does not do justice to what this means for the governance and life 
cycles of these efforts. In this article, we propose a conceptual framework that seeks to 
explain the formation, governance, and life cycle of public–nonprofit collaborations. 
 As is noted by Melissa Stone and Jodi Sandfort, “research on nonprofit 
organizations does not fully consider how the policy environment shapes organizational 
operation and performance and shapes how actors act strategically to advance their 
organizational interests.”1 And, in 2006, David Renz suggested that, in fact, many 
governance decisions are made at a meta level—above the realm of any single nonprofit 
board—in the funding and policy environments.2 Thus, Renz writes, understanding 
governance as merely board activity is shortsighted and limiting; he advocates a new 
focus on interorganizational governance processes that occur as organizations work 
together to address social problems.3 Such collaborations can be relatively long or short 
term, and they ordinarily contain power dynamics that must be worked out. But when the 
collaboration mixes public and private organizations, other issues often emerge having to 
do with changing institutional interests and tenures. This leads us to consider what the 
factors are that lead to the formation of public–nonprofit partnerships, how they are 
governed, and the influences on their life cycle. 
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 We base our observations here, in part, on a longitudinal case study of a public 
nonprofit collaboration in the United Kingdom. This partnership was aimed at 
neighborhood regeneration in deprived areas of one United Kingdom city.4 The head of 
the regeneration team, an employee of the city council, initiated the collaboration and 
acted as a key coordinator. The research examined the development of the collaboration 




Many terms have been used to describe configurations of organizations that voluntarily 
agree to collaborate. This is confusing and impedes conceptual clarity. We use the terms 
collaboration and partnership interchangeably to refer to a formalized, joint working 
arrangement between organizations that remain legally autonomous while engaging in 
ongoing, coordinated collective action to achieve outcomes that none of them could 
achieve on their own. When the number of participants exceeds two or three, network is 
also often used, and there is little definitional distinction made. 
The term governance is even more elusive. It is rooted in a Latin word meaning to 
steer or give direction, but it is used in a number of different ways, both within and across 
disciplines and entities. In fact, one of the more useful ways of distinguishing between 
different usages involves the level of analysis at which the concept is applied.5 
In this article, however, we focus exclusively on the interorganizational level, 
examining how collaborations between organizations are governed. Keith Provan and 
Patrick Kenis argue that the governance of networks is important for their effectiveness, 
although this topic has been neglected in research.6 They state that a focus on governance 
involves the use of institutions and structures of authority and collaboration to allocate 
resources and to coordinate and control joint action across the network as a whole. Unlike 
organizations, networks must be governed without the benefit of hierarchy or ownership.7 
Building on these definitions, we propose that the governance of collaborations 
entails the design and use of a structure and processes that enable actors to set the overall 
direction of the collaboration, and that coordinate and allocate resources for the 




Within organizations, governance structures and processes are shaped by legal and 
regulatory requirements. The governance of collaborations is more elusive, as they are 
often established without any clear legal form or body in charge, and the relationships 
between partners are subject to change.8 Public collaborations are often highly dynamic 
and even chaotic, as they must respond to complex and changing policy environments 
and deal with internal paradoxes and tensions.9 The governance structures of 
collaborations are therefore more fluid than in organizational contexts, changing in 
response to internal and external drivers, as well as to participants’ attempts to manage 
inherent tensions.10 
A complex and changing national policy and economic environment can lead to 
changes in the opportunities for collaboration at the local level, changing the priorities of 
public partners, perhaps altering their commitment to the collaboration, and even leading 
to its decline or demise. Nonprofit organizations must remain aware of these potential 
dynamics and risks when engaging in public–nonprofit collaborations. 
To provide a framework to better understand the formation and life cycle of 
public–nonprofit collaborations, we tested and refined an existing conceptual model 
developed by Douglas Lober, Lois Takahashi, and Gayla Smutny.11 They extend John 
Kingdon’s seminal work, which explains the formation of public policies in terms of the 
opening up of policy windows and the actions of policy entrepreneurs.12 These windows 
are assumed to both open and, after a while, close, so the framework assumes a temporal 
dimension. Lober, Takahashi, and Smutny argue that the formation of collaborations can 
be similarly explained in terms of opening up collaborative windows that can be 
exploited by collaborative entrepreneurs. Takahashi and Smutny extend the model further 
to explain the short-lived nature of many collaborations. They suggest that “initial 
governance structures emanating from particular collaborative windows and 
entrepreneurs limit their adaptability and portend their short-term demise.”13  
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Collaborative Windows, Collaborative Entrepreneurs, and the Formation of 
Collaborations 
To explain how policy windows are formed, Kingdon proposes that three largely 
independent, temporal streams run through the political system: a problem stream, a 
policy (or solution) stream, and a political stream. The problem stream consists of issues 
or situations that interest groups identify as “problems” to be addressed. The 
policy/solution stream consists of policy proposals advocated by various groups to 
address the problems. The political stream consists of various influences on the political 
system (e.g., public opinion, the media, and elections).14  
Kingdon argues that whenever these different streams converge, a “policy 
window” opens, presenting an opportunity to adopt new policies. For this to happen, 
however, policy entrepreneurs (either individuals or groups) must recognize that the 
window has opened and have the skills to exploit the opportunity and gain support for 
their proposals.15 
In trying to understand the formation of collaborations, Lober adds a fourth 
stream—the organizational stream—that encompasses changes in organizational and 
industry behavior regarding the issues being addressed. He also suggests the political 
stream needs to be broadened to include social and economic factors affecting the issues 
to be addressed (hereafter called the PSE stream). According to Lober, convergence in 
these four streams can create the conditions for forming a collaboration (i.e., a 
collaborative window rather than a policy window).16 For this to happen, however, the 
opportunity must be exploited by collaborative entrepreneurs. For Lober, as well as for 
Takahashi and Smutny, the collaborative entrepreneur resembles the policy entrepreneur. 
Collaborative entrepreneurs act as the catalyst for forming collaborations by working 
across organizational boundaries to join organizations and identify solutions to problems.  
The neighborhood regeneration partnership we observed was formed in 2009. The 
problem stream was that both national and local governments in the United Kingdom had 
long recognized some neighborhoods suffer multiple deprivations. In 2008, the city 
council’s neighborhood regeneration strategy recognized these deprived areas were 
growing in scale and intensity. The PSE stream contained several strands favorable to 
neighborhood regeneration, including an existing national strategy for neighborhood 
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renewal, which emphasized the role of local public authorities in tackling deprivation, 
and a growing public awareness of the negative impacts of increasing inequality. The 
policy/solution stream within the city council was influenced by various complementary 
policies, for example, a sustainable communities strategy that emphasized the need to 
tackle problem areas in the city. The organizational stream consisted of a wide range of 
public and nonprofit organizations that operated in the various deprived neighborhoods 
across the city. The city council’s head of regeneration acted as the collaborative 
entrepreneur, mobilizing contacts across various public bodies, nonprofit and community 
organizations, and generating new resources to bring organizations together to tackle the 
problem. 
The neighborhood regeneration program was launched with a three-tier 
governance structure consisting of neighborhood steering groups, to lead change in each 
of the deprived areas; a performance group, consisting of representatives from various 
partner organizations and heads of relevant services in the council to provide overall 
direction and monitor the performance of work in the neighborhoods; and a sponsor 
group, consisting of senior executives from relevant public bodies, businesses, and 
nonprofits to provide strategic challenge and accountability. 
 
Governance Arrangements and Life Cycle of Collaborations 
Takahashi and Smutny extend Lober’s model beyond the formation stage to include the 
operational stage of collaborations. They argue that collaborative entrepreneurs “initiate 
alliances among . . . partners using specific initial governance structures that fit with the 
participants and the features of the collaborative window.”17 They further suggest that 
this initial governance structure seriously constrains the future adaptability and resilience 
of the partnership, because “organizational inertia and the time-consuming process of 
collaborative governance” make these structures resistant to change.18 They suggest that 
collaborative entrepreneurs and other partners in the collaboration may not “have the 
skills to maintain, sustain, or adapt the collaborative partnership’s initial governance 
structure to changing temporal and spatial conditions after the collaborative window 
closes.”19 They therefore propose that features of a collaboration’s formation contain the 
seeds for its demise in a relatively short time, as initial governance structures fail to 
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adapt. For nonprofit organizations and community groups, understanding what lies 
behind the dynamic nature of collaborations and their governance arrangements might 
help them advance their goals when collaborating with more powerful public authorities. 
Our research suggests that the model developed by Lober and extended by 
Takahashi and Smutny needs further refinement. First, our research suggests that the four 
streams comprising the collaborative window are not independent, as stated in the 
previous models, but interdependent. In particular, once the collaboration is formed, 
changes in the political, social, and economic stream may influence both the solution and 
organizational streams. For example, the regeneration partnership was affected by several 
important changes in the collaborative window that occurred in the period of 2009 
through 2012. The global financial crisis of 2008 led to cuts in public expenditure, which 
in turn led to cuts in the budgets of the council and other public bodies involved in the 
partnership. This impacted the organizational stream as it led to cuts in the regeneration 
team and the resources available for neighborhood regeneration and a decline in the 
commitment of some of the other public partners. The government also relaxed some 
restrictions on local councils, allowing them to resume building public housing. This 
impacted the policy/solution stream as efforts of the council’s regeneration team began to 
focus more on a major public–private partnership to redevelop one of the deprived 
neighborhoods.  
Second, the model is overly pessimistic about the ability of collaborations to 
change their governance structures. While changing the partnership’s governance 
structure was not easy, changes did occur, often driven by internal tensions and 
challenges, arising from the different expectations and goals of participants and a tension 
between efficiency and inclusiveness. Particularly in the performance group, there were 
tensions over the purpose of the group, whether it was there to monitor the performance 
of the neighborhood steering groups and manage risk or to provide a forum to discuss 
problems and issues. The large size of the group also led to concerns over the efficiency 
and effectiveness of the group, with some particpants feeling it had just become a 
“talking shop.” Eventually the group was allowed to wither away, and the council’s 
regeneration team took over responsibility for coordinating the work across the 
neighborhoods. 
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While some neighborhood steering groups continued to be active, despite the 
decline in support from the regeneration team, the regeneration program was not 
extended to new neighborhoods as originally planned. In or view, the changes in the four 
streams, which influenced the priorities and commitment of different partners to the 
collaboration and the resources available to achieve its plans, were more important to the 
collaboration’s long-term future than were difficulties encountered in changing how it 
was governed. 
In conclusion, we posit that collaborations of all kinds, but particularly public–
nonprofit partnerships, need to be aware of how changes in the collaborative window are 
likely to affect the partnership and may lead to its decline. In addition, these 
collaborations are likely to face important internal tensions and emergent challenges that 
must be addressed by those who govern and manage the collaboration. Some of these 
tensions may appear as a battle between efficiency and inclusiveness, or may seem to be 
about goals and ways of working, but the truth is that they are part and parcel of the effort 
and not necessarily a sign of dysfunction. They do have to be managed skillfully, but they 
quite naturally can be expected to lead to changes in governance structures and processes. 
In the end, however, understanding that there are windows of opportunity for some 
collaborations will help nonprofit participants, in the cases where that is necessary, 
recalibrating and redeploying their efforts to greatest stead while not losing the potential 
of future collaborative windows and partners.  
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